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The object of this paper was to examine wiJether tiJe rise of the labor movement brought 
about the segmentation of the blue collar labor market and the development of the firm 
internal labor market(FILM) in Korea after 1987. We found that it did. The employment 
stability of workers in large firms has increased and wage differential by firm size has been 
enlarged. The male blue collar workers in the large firms prefer to stay in a firm rather than 
to move among fIrms. One of the factors that resulted in segmentation is that Korean labor 
unions are enterprise unions. 
This paper also tried to figure out the characteristics of the Korean FILM by analyzing 
employment practices. One of the important characteristics is the high stability of 
employment and low use of temporary workers. This causes some rigidity in labor force 
utilization. However, employers can adjust the size of employment to some extent by such 
practices as transfer of workers and the adjustment of working hours. The pursuit of 
functional stability or flexible specialization by multi-skilling is not common in Korea. 
INTRODUCTION 
The study of the internal labor market(henceforth ILM) and labor market 
segmentation is one of the major subjects of industrial sOciology. And there 
are several theories concerning what are the major factors that bring about 
the development of ILM. One of the most important factors mentioned by 
these theories is the rise of the labor movement. The 'radical theorists' such 
as Edwards(1979), Gordon et al.(1982), and Stone(1975) maintained that the 
control strategy of capitalists reacting to the rise of a strong labor movement 
resulted in the development of ILM and the segmentation of the labor 
market. Rubery(1978), from a different perspective, argued that the activity 
of a worker organization to protect the interest of its members plays an 
important part in shaping labor market segmentation. Even Doeringer and 
Piore, who focus on workers' skills(Finley 1983), acknowledged the role of 
workers' collective action such as the strike in preserving the customary 
rules of ILM(Doeringer and Piore 1971, p.24). 
The Korean labor market was not a segmented market but a competitive 
market until the mid-eighties(Song 1989). This was especially so in the case 
of the blue collar labor market. The firm internal labor markets(henceforth 
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FILM) were not well developed even in large corporatio'ns and, accordingly, 
the labor market was not segmented between large firms and small firms. 
There were several firms with highly developed ILMs for blue collar 
workers such as the POSCO(Pohang Iron and Steel Co.). But, the cases like 
the POSCO's were not common. So, blue collar workers were regarded as a 
quite homogeneous social stratum.1 
And, it was generally argued that this situation was due to the absence of 
a strong labor movement. In the light of the economic structure, there were 
conditions that tend to develop the FILM in Korea. As the economic 
develpoment in Korea was led by the government and large corporations 
supported by the government, major industries were dominated by 
oligopolistic large corporations. These large corparations enjoyed much 
greater resources than small firms in many respects, and therefore, had 
ability to pay higher wages to their workers than small firms. But, 
employers of the large corporations didn't feel it necessary to pay much 
higher wages than those of the outside market to their workers or develop 
the FILM. They reckoned that workers did not dare to go on strike under 
the situation that the labor movement was harshly oppressed by the state. 
Moreover, as the working conditions of large corporations were better than 
those of small firms, even to a slight degree, employers of large corporations 
did not have much difficulty in finding applicants who wanted to be 
employed. 
However, Korea witnessed an upsurge of the labor movement from 1987 
on. According to the above mentioned theories, this change is expected to 
bring about the development of the ILM and the segmentation of the labor 
market. 
But the relation between a strong labor movement and labor market 
segmentation is not the same everywhere. The change in the labor market 
and the development of the FILM depends on the structure of trade union 
and industrial relations. A strong industrial union can resist the segmentation 
of the labor market as has been the case in Sweden(Shin 1988; Esping-
Anderson 1985). Therefore, the effect of the labor movement on the labor 
market should be studied empirically. This is the first subject of this paper. 
The second subject of this paper is to investigate the charateristics of the 
structure of the FILM in Korea. The structure of the FILM can be various 
according to the specific country, industry, and individual firm. And, it can 
be studied in several perspectives. One is focusing on the homogeneity 
I This homogeneity was confined to the same gender, The Korean blue collar labor market was 
segmented between male and female workers and the wage differential by sex was very large, 
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Iheterogeneity of workers. Radical theorists such as Edwards and Stone 
maintained that the development of the FILM made workers heterogeneous 
within a firm. On the contrary, Freeman and Medoff(1984) suggested that 
union wage policy can decrease the wage inequality within establishments. 
The other perspective focuses on seniority I ability in determining the rule of 
the FILM. By Doeringer and Piore, the determinants of the internal 
movement of workers in the FILM can be ability or seniority. Workers prefer 
seniority while employers prefer ability. The structure of the ILM reflects the 
compromise of the interests of management and workers(Doeringer and 
Piore 1971, pp.56-63). 
In this paper we wiil study the structure of the FILM from the viewpoint 
of the flexibility I rigidity of the labor force. As far as the FILM is a set of 
rules which the employer cannot change deliberately, it will cause some 
rigidity in the use of the labor force. But how much rigidity it causes 
depends on the structure of the FILM. For example, the Japanese FILM is 
more flexible than that of Britain's while Japanese workers enjoy a higher 
stability of employment. 
And we will concentrate on the employment practices of many sides of 
the FILM in this paper. We choose it because we can understand the 
characteristics and, especially, the flexibility I rigidity of the FILM better 
from the study of employment practices. 
It seems necessary to define the concept of the FILM before we try to 
describe the characteristics of it. In Western countries, it is generally defined 
as something like port of entry, job ladder and promotion. But we think this 
definition is not always appropriate. There can be a FILM without a job 
ladder(Ryan 1981). We think the above definition is especially inappropriate 
to Korea. In Korea, there is no socially defined classification of jobs for blue 
collar workers. Workers do not get promoted to higher jobs unless it is to 
foreman. But workers' wages generally increase with the increase of 
duration of service although they do not get pr.Jmoted to higher jobs. 
In this paper, we follow the definition by Doeringer and Piore that the 
ILM is "an administrative unit within which the pricing and allocation of 
labor is governed by a set of administrative rules and procedures." The ILM 
is distinguished from the external labor market where economic variables 
govern(Doeringer and Piore 1971, pp.1-2). Therefore, we can argue that 
there is a FILM if wage and allocation of workers in a firm is determined 
independently from the outside market regardless of the existence of a port 
of entry or job ladder. 
The stability of employment also becomes a vital aspect of the FILM, for 
the rules of the FILM are developed to enhance the stability of employment. 
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We can not say socially significant ILM exist even if wages are determined 
within firms independently from the outside labor market, unless the 
stability of employment is high in those firms. So we use wage differential 
and employment stability as two indices in order to figure out the existence 
of the FILM. 
DATA AND METHOD 
We use two major research methods in this paper. The one is the analysis 
of the sample data of national surveys made by the Ministry of Labor. The 
sample data of national surveys used in this study are the 'Occupational 
wage survey' and the 'Survey on circulation conditions of labor force' in 
1981, 1984, 1987, and 1990. The 'Occupational wage survey' is the annual 
survey about workers' wages of firms employing more than 10 employees. 
We use this to see the wage differential by firm size and by year. The data 
we use in this paper are randomly sampled 5-8% samples of the 
'Occupational wage survey'. And the size is about 25,000 cases each. The 
'Survey on circulation conditions of labor force' is the biennial survey about 
entrance and exit of workers in firms employing more than 10 employees. 
This is used to investigate the characteristics of the FILM by analyzing the 
structure of employment practices. The data we use in this paper are 
randomly sampled 10-20% samples of the 'Survey on circulation conditions 
of labor force'. We also use survey reports of the Ministry of Labor. The 
'Report on monthly labor survey' is used to see the turnover rate of 
workers. And the 'Survey report on establishment labor conditions' is used 
to see the number of temporary workers. 
Another research method we use is interviewing with managers and 
union officers of major firms in the manufacturing industry. The number of 
firms we visited is seven. They are the first or the second largest 
corporations in industries such as shipbuilding; automobile manufacture; 
machinery; woods and furniture; petroleum production; non-metallic 
mineral products; and fabricated metal products. In these interviews we 
tried to discern the detailed features of the FILM and the attitude of 
employers and unions on the FILM and industrial relations. 
THE RISE OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT 
Until the mid-eighties the independent labor movement had been harshly 
suppressed by the state to maintain low wages in Korea. There existed the 
infamous labor law which prohibited strikes and made it almost impossible 
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to organize a union. The government even violated laws to break 
independent unions. Though there were more than 2,500 unions with 
almost a million members, most of these unions were as good as non-
existent. They were dependent on employers and nearly helpless in 
representing workers' discontents and demands. 
The 'big struggle of 1987' has totally changed this situation. From then on, 
workers are not passive anymore. The number of unions has increased from 
2,675 in December 1986 to 7,698 in December 1990. And, the number of 
union members also has almost doubled. Now unions are organized in 
almost all the major firms of the manufacturing industry. Moreover, unions 
have become quite independent of employers to be an important factor in 
determining working conditions. 
Strikes also proliferated. The number of strikes, which was only 276 in 
1986, increased to 3,749 and 1,873 in 1987 and 1988 respectively. From 1990, 
the number of strikes suddenly diminished to below 500 a year due to the 
government's repressive intervention. But, this does not mean that the labor 
movement has been greatly weakened. Unions in major firms of the 
manufacturing industry are still quite strong and generally antagonistic to 
employers and government. 
By the way, one important characteristic of the Korean labor movement is 
that unions are enterprise unions organized by each firm. This situation has 
an historical origin. The industrial union had been banned until 1987 by the 
labor union law. The government banned the industrial union to weaken 
the labor movement. Though the article which banned the industrial union 
has been abolished with the revision of the labor law in 1987, the industrial 
or occupational union is still ahnost non-exsitent. This means that working 
conditions including wages are determined in each enterprise by collective 
bargaining between the individual employer and enterprise union. Unions 
say it is desirable for them to consolidate into industrial unions. And some 
union leaders are trying to carry on the plan of organizing an industrial 
union. However, there are little results until now. 
Under the system of the enterprise union, it is quite difficult to organize 
and maintain a union in small firms. Accordingly, the union organization 
rate is very lo~ in small firms. The percentage of firms with unions is only 
4.9% in firms employing less than 300 workers, while that of firms 
employing more than 300 workers is 68.5%.2 
2 Korea Labor Institute, Quarterly Labor Review 4, No. 2(1991), p.47. 
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SEGMENTATION OF THE LABOR MARKET 
In this section we will see whether the FILMs were developed in the large 
corporations and the blue collar labor market was segmented by firm size 
after the rise of the labor movement in Korea. As we regard wage 
differential and employment stability as the most important indices of 
segmentation, we will see whether the wage differential by firm size has 
been enlarged and stability of employment has been enhanced in large firms 
since 1987. 
Wage Differential by Firm Size 
Table 1 presents the wage differential of male blue collar workers by firm 
size after controlling human capital variables such as level of education, 
TABLE 1. HOURLY WAGE* OF MALE BLUE COLLAR WORKERS IN THE 
KOREAN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY (WON) 
Year Firm size Wage A(Eta)'" Wage B(Beta) 
small" 732(100.0) 814(100.0) 
1981 medium 771(105.3) 801 (98.4) 
large 885(120.8) 841(103.3) 
(.15) (.04) 
small 964(100.0) 1,115(100.0) 
1984 medium 1,048(108.7) 1,091 (97.8) 
large 1,224(126.9) 1,183(106.1) 
(.18) (.08) 
small 1,266(100.0) 1,463(100.0) 
1987 medium 1,381(109.1) 1,442 (98.6) 
large 1,557(123.0) 1,505(102.9) 
(.15) (.04) 
small 2,222(100.0) 2,661(100.0) 
1990 medium 2,734(123.0) 2,835(106.5) 
large 3,427(154.2) 3,259(122.5) 
(.33) (.18) 
• The figures in the table represent total wages per hour(including bonus) . 
•• 'Small' means the firm employing less than 100 regular workers, 'medium' 
means the firm employing more than 100 and less than 500 workers, 'large' 
means the firm employing more than 500 workers . 
••• Wage A is the wage without controlling the human capital variables, and wage 
B is the wage after controlling the human capital variables by MCA method. 
Data: Ministry of Labor, 'Occupational Wage Survey' data, each year. 
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duration of service and career in the 1980s. We can see in this table that the 
wage differential by firm size has been significantly enlarged after 1987. 
Until 1987, the wage differential by firm size had been small. The wage 
differential between the firm employing less than 100 workers and the firm 
employing more than 500 workers after controlling the human capital 
variables in 1981, 1984, and 1987 were 103.3, 106.1, and 102.9 respectively. 
This means that workers in large firms had received only 3%-6% higher 
wages than the workers in small firms before the rise of the labor 
mevement. 
But in 1990, this differential has been enlarged to 100 : 122.5. Therefore, 
workers of large firms receive much higher wages than workers of small 
firms even if their human capitals are the same. This shows that wages in 
large firms are determined by rules of the firm and independently from the 
outside labor market. And, this means in turn that the FILM is developed in 
large firms and the blue collar labor market is segmented by firm size. 
This widening of wage differential is partly due to the fact that the Korean 
unions are enterprise unions. The annual wage increase is negotiated and 
determined within a company. Unionists say it is necessary to organize an 
industrial joint bargaining to equalize wages by firm size and to enhance the 
solidarity of all workers. But, joint bargaining is not being organized easily 
because of such factors as the government's intervention, employers' 
reluctance, and big unions' egOism. Even in some industry where the 
industry based bargaining is organized, participants are confined to unions 
and employers of large firms. There is no joint bargaining in which large 
and small firms participate together. So, employers of large firms are almost 
free to pay higher wages than small firms to their employees to escape 
strike. It also means that Korean unions have failed to do the role of 
equalizing working conditions across firms. 
Turnover Rate 
Turning to the turnover rate in Table 2, two facts are to be noted. Firstly, 
the turnover rate of male blue collar workers in large firms has decreased 
significantly in the 1980s. In 1984, the turnover rate of male blue collar 
workers in the firms employing more than 500 workers was 3.6% per 
month. This means that, on an average, more than 43% of all male blue 
collar workers quit their jobs in a year in large firms. The high turnover rate 
was due to the lack of the development of the FILM, and also it was said to 
be one of the major causes which hamper the improvement of workers' 
skills. But in 1990, this rate has dropped to 1.76%. Now more workers of 
large firms choose to stay in the firm than to move between firms. In other 
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words, they are using the strategy of 'voice' or 'loyalty' than 'exit' 
(Hirshman 1970). 
Secondly, in contrast to the turnover rate of large firms, the turnover rate 
of small firms hasn't changed significantly. The turnover rate of male blue 
collar workers in the firms employing less than 100 workers in 1984 was 7. 
9% per month. This rate is still 7.37% in 1990. Consequently, the difference 
of turnover rate by firm size has been enlarged since the mid-eighties. In 
contrast to workers in large firms, workers in small firms still suffer from 
low stability of employment. This difference in employment stability also is 
a feature of labor market segmentation. 
We can say from the trend of wage differential and the turnover rate that 
the economic conditions of workers have become heterogeneous by the firm 
size since the rise of the labor movement in 1987. This heterogeneity can, in 
turn, be a factor that weakens the labor movement. With the development of 
the FILM, the pOSSibility that unions in large firms become more moderate 
has gotten greater. 
One more fact to be noted is that the increase of the stability of 
employment and development of the FILM since 1987 is found mainly in 
male blue collar workers. As can be noted from Table 3, the turnover rate of 
female blue collar workers in large corporations is still quite high. It is 4.01 % 
per month in 1990, which means that about half of female blue collar 
workers quit their jobs in a year. And, though the turnover rate of female 
blue collar workers has decreased since 1987, the difference is not large. It 
was 5.9% in 1981 and still 4.01 % in 1990. This high rate of turnover is part;ly 
due to the fact that female workers generally quit their jobs after marriage. 
TABLE 2. MONTHLY TURNOVER RATE OF MALE BLUE COLLAR 
WORKERS IN THE KOREAN MANUFACTURING 
INDUSTRY (%) 
Year Total Size 1* Size 2 Size 3 Size 4 Size 5 
1980 5.8 7.4 7.8 6.6 5.6 4.2 
1982 5.1 6.4 6.8 6.9 4.9 3.3 
1984 5.9 7.9 7.7 7.4 5.4 3.6 
1986 4.3 6.3 6.3 4.9 4.1 2.5 
1988 5.0 8.0 8.1 6.6 3.6 2.1 
1990 4.11 7.37 7.08 5.11 3.16 1.76 
* The number of employee in 'size l' is 10-29, 'size 2' is 30-99, 'size 3' is 
100-299, 'size 4' is 300-499, 'size 5' is more than 500 each. 
Source: Ministry of Labor, Report on Monthly Labor Survey, December, 
each year. 
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TABLE 3. MONTHLY TURNOVER RATE OF FEMALE BLUE COLLAR WORKERS AND 
MALE WHITE COLLAR WORKERS IN THE KOREAN MANUFACTURING 
INDUSTRY (%) 
Year Total Size 1 Size 2 Size 3 Size 4 SizeS 
Female blue collar 
1981 6.7 7.2 7.6 7.6 6.6 5.9 
1983 6.4 6.3 7.1 6.8 7.3 5.9 
1985 5.8 6.4 6.3 6.9 5.3 5.1 
1987 5.3 5.8 6.0 5.8 5.0 4.9 
1989 4.66 5.18 6.57 5.15 4.37 3.62 
1990 4.70 5.39 5.75 5.14 4.41 4.01 
Male white collar 
1981 2.3 3.4 3.2 2.3 2.2 1.6 
1983 2.0 2.7 2.7 2.1 1.7 1.5 
1985 2.1 4.0 2.8 2.0 1.9 1.4 
1987 1.8 2.6 2.4 2.0 1.5 1.3 
1989 2.03 3.58 3.19 2.06 1.51 1.19 
1990 2.09 3.75 3.17 2.26 1.49 1.25 
Source: Ministry of Labor, Report on Monthly Labor Survey, December, each year. 
But, it also reflects the fact that the FILM is not well developed for female 
workers. 
The turnover rate of male white collar workers has not changed much 
through the 1980s either. For example, the turnover rate of male white collar 
workers in large corporations employing more than 500 workers is 1.6% in 
1981 and 1.25% in 1990. One more characteristic is that the turnover rate of 
white collar workers had been quite low even before 1987. This is because 
the FILM for white collar workers was developed before 1987 while the 
FILM for blue collar workers was not. 
EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES 
In this section, we are going to see the characteristics of the FILM by 
analyzing the structure of employment practices in the Korean 
manufacturing industry. The typical features of employment practice in a 
firm with the FILM are port of entry and employment stability. But, the 
features of employment practices of a firm with the FILM can be various. In 
the USA, the characteristics of employment practices for blue collar workers 
are port of entry and application of seniority rule in layoff. In Japan, it is 
life-long employment. What is the characteristics of employment practices 
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in Korea? We will try to answer it by looking into the structure of port of 
entry and employment stability in Korea. Also we will see how employers 
try to enhance the flexibility of employment. 
Port of Entry 
If there is a port of entry, workers are employed in the lowest grade job 
and those who moved beyond entry ports enjoy shelter from outside 
competition. All jobs within the FILM are filled internally through transfer 
or upgrading from the entry job. However, the ports of entry in a firm with 
the FILM can take different forms. According to Doeringer and Piore(1971), 
the port of entry can be 'closed' or 'open'. In the closed market, all jobs are 
filled internally. And, in the open market, all job classifications are filled 
directly from the external labor market. 
In Korea; it is not easy to know the structure of the port of entry because 
there is no clear distinction of jobs among blue collar workers. But, we will 
be able to say the port of entry is 'closed' if a firm mainly employs 
inexperienced(low skilled) workers, or treats any newly employed worker 
as a beginner regardless of his career. 
It is generally agreed that the port of entry was 'open' in Korean firms, 
especially for blue collar workers, until the mid-eighties. When an employer 
hired workers, he considered their outside careers in determining wages. 
This became an important factor that made the rate of inter-firm mobility 
high, as we can see in Table 2. 
We can see the details of port of entry by analyzing the data of the 'Survey 
on circulation conditions of labor force'. Table 4 presents the outside career 
of newly employed workers of the first half of 1984,1987, and 1990 analysed 
from the 'Survey on circulation conditions of labor force' data. What we can 
find from this table is as follows. 
Firstly, the percentage of the workers with careers in the same occupation 
out of the body of newly employed workers is generally more than 50%, 
that is, more than half of newly employed workers have careers in the same 
occupation. Therefore, we will be able to say that the port of entry is 'open' 
in Korea. 
Secondly, as can be seen by year, there is no trend indicating that port of 
entry has become more 'closed' since 1987. The percentage of workers 
without careers in the same occupation in large firms is higher in 1987 than 
in 1990. 
Thirdly, as can be seen by firm size, the percentage of workers without 
careers in the same occupation is higher in larger firms. In 1990, for 
example, this percentage is 49.7% in large firms and 41.0% in small firms. 
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TABLE 4. OUTSIDE CAREER OF NEWLY EMPLOYED WORKERS BY ESTABLISHMENT 
SIZE IN THE KOREAN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY (MALE BLUE COLLAR 
WORKERS; %) 
Year Years of career Small Medium Large 
1984 total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
none 39.8 48.1 47.4 
less than a year 17.5 19.5 16.3 
1-3 years 18.4 14.1 16.9 
3-5 years 12.1 9.5 11.8 
more than 5 years 12.2 8.8 7.6 
1987 total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
none 37.5 43.2 54.6 
less than a year 23.8 17.7 17.1 
1-3 years 18.4 18.0 14.7 
3-5 years 11.1 11.5 7.2 
more than 5 years 9.3 9.6 6.5 
1990 total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
none 41.0 43.9 49.7 
less than a year 17.1 .18.7 12.8 
1-3 years 16.1 19.4 18.8 
3-5 years 11.4 8.7 11.1 
more than 5 years 14.5 9.1 7.6 
Data: Ministry of Labor, 'Survey on Circulation Conditions of Labor Force' data, the first half 
of 1984, 1987, and 1990. 
So, we can say that the ports of entry in large firms are more' closed' 
compared to those of small firms. But, the ports of entry of large firms also 
have the charateristic of 'open' entry because this percentage is less than 
50%. 
Turning to the starting wages of newly employed workers, we can see 
that employers do not pay much higher wages to the workers with outside 
careers after 1987. Table 5 presents the starting wages of newly employed 
workers after controlling the workers' level of education. 
Firstly, the wage premium of workers with outside careers has been 
diminished considerably after 1987 in large firms. For example, the workers 
with 5-9 year' careers received 53% higher starting wages than the workers 
without outside careers in 1984. But, in 1990, they receive only 17% higher 
wages. The workers with 1-3 years' careers, who received 16% higher wages 
than the non-career wor~ers in 1984, receive only 2% higher wages than the 
non-career workers in 1990. They have come to be treated almost like the 
non-career workers. This means that port of entry has become more closed 
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TABLE 5. STARTING WAGE RATE OF NEWLY EMPLOYED 
WORKERS BY OUTSIDE CARRER (MALE BLUE 
COLLAR WORKERS) 
Year Years of career Small firms' Large firms 
1984 none 100.0 100.0 
less than a year 115.4 102.5 
1-3 years 130.9 116.2 
3-5 years 139.9 140.8 
5-9 years 175.6 153.5 
more than 10 years 176.1 165.4 
1990 none 100.0 100.0 
less than a year 107.9 99.6 
1-3 years 120.9 102.1 
3-5 years 133.8 112.9 
5-9 years 149.2 117.5 
more than 10 years 147.3 141.9 
• 'Small' and 'large' mean the same as in Table 1. 
Data: Ministry of Labor, 'Survey on Circulation Conditions of 
Labor Force' data, the first half of 1984,1987, and 1990. 
in Korea. But, workers' careers are reflected in their wages, though by 
smaller degree. Especially the wage premium of workers with more than 10 
year careers in large firms is still about 50%. So, port of entry still has the 
characteristic of an open market. 
Secondly, the wage premiums of workers with outside careers are still 
large in small firms. The workers with 5-9 years' careers receive about 50% 
higher starting wages than the workers without outside careers in 1990. This 
also shows that the FILMs are not well developed in small firms. 
In sum, though the port of entry in large corporations has become more 
closed since 1987, it also has the characteristics of an open market in that a 
high percentage of workers with outside careers are employed with a wage 
premium. 
These characteristics relate to unions' policies. We could find from 
interviews with union leaders and firms' staffs that unions generally do not 
intervene in employers' decisions on whom to employ. This is because the 
workers' wages are not directly related to their jobs in Korea. The Korean 
wage system is similar to the Japanese 'nenko' system. The workers' wages 
increase with the increase of their durations of service or ages even if they 
do not get promoted on the job ladder. Therefore, the workers' chance of 
wage increase does not diminish even if someone with a longer career is 
newly employed and receives a higher wage. However, workers complain if 
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a newly employed worker receives a much higher wage than them unless it 
is quite clear that his skill is much better than theirs. This is one reason why 
the wage premium reflecting workers' careers has diminished since 1987.3 
Dismissal of Workers 
Workers in a firm with the FILM enjoy stability of employment. 
Employment stability stems from two sources. First, employment stability is 
enhanced when workers do not want to quit their firm because of better 
working conditions than the outside market, such as higher wages, 
expectations of promotion, the firm's welfare facilities, etc. Second, if 
workers are ptotected from the deliberate dismissal of employers, they will 
enjoy employment stability. We are more interested in the latter item. The 
Japanese 'life long employment' which is applied to regular workers, 
especially in large firms, is a case where workers enjoy a very high stability 
of employment. Workers are expected to work until retirement age and the 
firing of workers is regarded acceptable only in exceptional cases(Tsuda 
1973; Cole 1971). In Korea, employers had had the right to dismiss workers 
until 1987. Although it was forbidden for employers to dismiss workers 
'without due reason' by labor law, many workers were dismissed by 
various reasons without any protection, especially in the period of economic 
recession. 
But, the strengthening of labor unions from 1987 made it very difficult for 
employers to dismiss workers deliberately especially in large firms. The 
staffs of almost every company we visited for interview said that 1/ now it is 
almost impossible for the company to fire a worker unless he quits himself." 
Moreover, there is no general practice of layoff in Korea, which also 
enhances employment stability. Unions generally offer very strong 
opposition to the dismissal of their members. One reason for it is that 
Korean unions are enterprise unions, and the decrease in the number of 
employees directly results in the decrease in the number of union members, 
and, accordingly, union resources including budget. Many unions 
succeeded in forcing employers to sign a collective agreement which makes 
it necessary for employers to get an agreement from the union or consult 
with the union before dismissing a worker. In this sense, blue collar workers 
in large firms in Korea enjoy almost 'life-long' employment like in Japan. 
However, it is difficult to say that life long employment has become a social 
norm yet. The employment stability is guaranteed by the power of the 
3 Another reason is the enlargement of wage differential by firm size. Employers of large 
firms can hire experienced workers with a smaller wage premium reflecting their careers, 
because the average wage of large firms is much higher than that of small firms. 
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unions rather than by employers' own volition. Employers are trying to 
revise labor laws to facilitate layoff in time of recesssion. Moreover, many 
union leaders are dismissed in spite of the opposition of unions by 
employers who want to weaken the labor movement. 
And, in small firms, the power of unions to regulate the deliberate 
dismissal of workers is generally weak, and dismissal policies are 
comparatively freer for employers. 
By the way, long term employment like Japanese life-long employment 
will diminish the flexibility of employment. Therefore, employers will try to 
have flexibility in using the labor force. Flexibility of employment is 
generally divided into 'numerical flexibility' and 'fuctional flexibility'. The 
major means of gaining numerical flexibility is the use of temporary 
workers who can be easily laid off in the period of economic recession and 
the major means of functional flexibility is transfer of workers within a firm. 
Use of Temporary Workers 
It is not easy to know the exact size of the body of temporary workers in 
Korea because one can not get detailed information on the non-regular 
workers by government statistics. The most general statistics which contain 
information on non-regular workers is the 'Survey on economically active 
population' by the Economic Planning Board. In these statistics, the number 
of daily workers who are employed by less than a month is available. 
However, the number of daily workers by industry or by firm size is not 
available. According to this survey, the ratio of daily workers out of all non-
farm workers is 15.9% in 1990. This percentage has been almost the same 
throughout the 1980s. So we can say that the size of the body of temporary 
workers is not small and it has not increased throughout the 1980s. 
The 'survey report on establishment labor conditions' also contains some 
information on non-regular workers, and the sizes of temporary and daily 
workers by firm size and by industry are available. But these statistics have 
some limits. The temporary and daily workers who have worked over 45 
days during the last 3 months from the survey date are regarded as regular 
workers. Therefore, it is not possible to know the exact size of the body of 
temporary or daily workers. However, we can know the employment trend 
of non-regular workers by firm size and by year. Table 6 presents the size of 
temporary workers by firm size in the manufacturing industry. What we 
can see from this table is as follows. First, the percentage of temporary and 
daily workers is not so large. The percentage of temporary and daily 
workers in firms employing 500-999 workers in 1989 is only 1.06%. Second, 
the percentage of temporary and daily workers get smaller with the increase 
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of firm size. Seeing the statistics of 1985, it is 4.37% in firms employing 50-99 
workers and 0.75% in firms employing more than 1,000 workers. This trend 
is the same in 1989. So, we can conclude that numerical flexibility is smaller 
in large firms. Third, this percentage has not increased since 1987. It has 
rather decreased since 1987 as is clear in Table 6. 
This shows that Korean employers have not pursued the strategy of 
increasing the employment size of temporary workers since 1987. There are 
several reasons for this. 
First of all, employers did not feel the necessity to use temporary workers 
before 1987. Wages had been low and turnover rate had been high. When 
6mployers wanted to reduce the size of employment in the period of 
recession, they had only to stop recruiting workers. Soon, the suspension of 
recruitment resulted in the decrease in the number of workers. They could 
dismiss workers also. Moreover, as it was usual for workers to work 
overtime, employers could reduce production without reducing 
employment by curtailing overtime work. After the rise of the labor 
movement in 1987, employers are now trying to use regular workers more 
intensively and reduce the size of temporary workers in conjunction with 
workers' wages being swiftly raised and it being difficult to layoff workers. 
The shortage of the labor supply also becomes a factor in decreasing the 
size of temporary and daily workers. It is difficult for employers to use 
TABLE 6. THE PERCENTAGE OF TEMPORARY AND DAILY WORKERS 
BY FIRM SIZE IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY 
Firm size Both Male Female 
(number of employees) sex 
1985 
50-99 4.37 3.09 6.12 
100-199 3.71 2.61 5.08 
300-499 2.24 1.91 2.62 
500-999 1.22 1.38 1.01 
1,000 and over 0.75 0.54 1.01 
1989 
50-99 2.92 1.90 4.36 
100-199 2.09 1.38 3.14 
300-499 1.51 0.94 2.39 
500-999 1.06 0.88 1.35 
1,000 and over 0.58 0.68 0.41 
Source: Ministry of Labor, 'Survey Report on Establishment Labor 
Conditions', 1985 and 1989. 
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temporary workers while a labor shortage is going on because workers 
prefer to be employed as regular workers. 
Aside from the use of temporary workers, there is another method of 
increasing numerical flexibility. It is the use of inside (sub)contracting.4 
Inside contracting can be a better method of increasing numerical flexibility 
because employers of ordering firms do not have to directly manage the 
workers of subcontracting firms. When employers want to reduce the labor 
force, they need only to suspend the contract with contracting firms without 
worrying about a dispute with workers who are laid off. By the way, there 
are no official statistics on inside contracting. So we will use the 
informations from interviews to see the features of inside contracting. 
First of all, we could see that only a few temporary or daily workers were 
hired in the firms we visited. In contrast to this, the number of workers 
employed in the inside contracting firms is much larger. On an average, it is 
about 10% of workers employed in the ordering firm. And employers are 
trying to increase the use of inside (sub)contracting, especially after 1987. 
They plan to hand over parts of their operations to sub-contractors 
gradually. But, the size of inside contracting has not significantly increased 
since 1987. The most important obstacle to the increase of inside contracting 
is the opposition by the union. Unions strongly oppose the increase of 
inside contracting because it results in the reduction of the number of union 
members. However, it is expected that the size of inside contracting will be 
increased gradually because employers have a strong interest in increasing 
the size of it. 
In sum, the size of non-regular workers is not so large, nor has it 
increased much since 1987. Therefore, we can say that Korean blue collar 
workers in large firms in the manufacturing industry are mainly composed 
of 'core' workers in Atkinson's term(Atkinso"n 1987). This situation causes 
some rigidity in employment. But, as the working hours in Korea is still 
quite long, employers can have the flexibility in labor use to some extent by 
adjusting working hours to market conditions. 
Transfer of Workers 
The transfer of workers within the firm can be a major method of 
increasing functional flexibility. Workers can be multi-skilled by transfer 
within firm. 
Korean employers could transfer workers within the firm or among firms 
4 By 'inside contracting', we mean contracting in which a fmn delegates a part of production and 
provides major facilities such as floor space, main machinery, raw material, etc. except its labor 
force to the (sub )contractor. 
LABOR MOVEMENT AND INTERNAL LABOR MARKET 39 
before 1987 because unions did not demonstrate strong resistance. And, 
workers did not have strong notions of job rights. However, this transfer of 
workers was used as a minor means of adjusting the size of employment, 
not as a means of increasing functional flexibility. 
The transfer of workers has become a more important means of labor 
force utilization since 1987. This is especially so in a firm which ceased 
recruiting to minimize the increase of labor cost. We could find it from our 
interviews. 
The Hyundai Shipbuilding Company ceased recruiting workers after 1987 
because of wage increase. Instead of it, the company began to take measures 
to enhance the efficiency of labor force utilization. One of them is to make 
each worker able to do more than one job. The company organized 'multi-
skill training' for this. After this, if there is a need to hire more workers for 
job A, the company could transfer workers of job B to job A instead of 
recruiting new workers. Thus, Hyundai Shipbuilding Company is pursuing 
the increase of functional flexibility. 
Nevertheless, the case like Hyundai's is an exceptional one. The practice 
of multi-skilling of workers is not commom in Korea. We could not find 
multi-skilling programs in any company we visited except Hyundai. There 
is no periodic transfer of workers to enhance their skills, which we can see 
in the Japanese employment system. And, the skill training programs for 
blue collar workers in large corporations are generally poor. 
For example, the Daewoo Heavy Industry Company, one of the 
companies we visited, almost stopped recruiting blue collar workers after 
1987, and supplemented personnel by inter-factory and intra-factory 
transfer. But, there is no multi-skilling program for blue collar workers. In 
this company, the transfer of workers is being practiced to meet the change 
of the volume of production. Generally speaking, the transfer of workers is 
not a means of having functional flexibility, but a means of having 
numerical flexibility in Korea. 
Workers tend to complain and even resist transfer. Especially, workers 
tend to oppose the transfer among factories in different regions. This 
opposition becomes an important obstacle for employers in redeploying 
workers. However, employers manage to succeed in the transfer of workers 
within a firm in spite of workers' complaints. The reason why transfer is 
implemented relatively easily in spite of workers' resistance is that the 
transfer causes little disadvantage to workers since their wages are not 
directly related to their jobs. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This paper tried to find whether or not the rise of the labor movement 
brought about the segmentation of the blue collar labor market and the 
development of the FILM in Korea. We could see that it did. The 
employment stability of workers in large firms has increased and wage 
differential by firm size has been enlarged. Male blue collar workers in large 
firms prefer to stay in a firm rather than to move among firms. One of the 
factors that resulted in the segmentation is that Korean labor unions are 
enterprise unions. 
This segmentation and development of the FILM, which is one of the 
effects of the rise of the labor movement, is expected to have some influence 
on the labor movement in turn. It is expected that the unions in large firms 
become more moderate, and even egoistic. As the wage and employment 
stability of workers in large firms are higher than those in small firms, large 
unions do not feel a strong necessity to share solidaristic activities with 
small unions. Also, it is expected that the system of enterprise unions will 
be solidified in Korea. 
This paper also tried to figure out the characteristics of the Korean FILM 
by analyzing employment practices. Of the important characteristics are the 
high stability of employment and the low use of temporary workers. This 
causes some rigidity in labor force utilization. However, employers can 
adjust the size of employment to some extent by such practices as transfer of 
workers and the adjustment of working hours. The pursuit of functional 
stability or flexible specialization by multi-skilling is not common in Korea. 
It can be said that Korean employers still depend on the Fordist method of 
labor use and control. 
REFERENCES 
Althauser, E., and A. Kalleberg. 1981. "Firms, Occupations and the Structure of 
Labor Markets: A Conceptual Analysis." Pp. 119-149 in Sociological Perspective on 
Labor Markets, edited by Ivar Berg. New York: Academic Press. 
Atkinson, J. 1987. "Flexibility or Fragmentation?: The United Kingdom Labor 
Market in the Eighties." Labor and Society 12(2): 87-105. 
Cole, R.E. 1971. Japanese Blue Collar. Berkeley, CA: Univ. of California Press. 
Doeringer, P., and M. Piore. 1971. Internal Labor Markets and Manpower Analysis. 
Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath. 
Edwards, R. 1979. Contested Terrain. New York and London: Basic Books. 
Esping-Anderson, G. 1985. Politics Against Markets. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. 
Press. 
LABOR MOVEMENT AND INTERNAL LABOR MARKET 41 
Finley, W. 1983. "One Occupation, Two Labor Markets: The Case of Longshore 
Crane Operators." American Sociological Review 48: 306-315. 
Freeman, R., and]. Medoff. 1984. What Do Unions Do? New York: Basic Books. 
Gordon, D., R. Edwards, and M.Reich. 1982. Segmented Work, Divided Workers. 
Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. 
Hirshman, A. 1970. Exit, Voice and Loyalty. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press. 
Ryan, P. 1981. "Segmentation and Internal Labor Market." Pp. 3-20 in The Dynamics 
of Labor Market Segmentation, edited by F. Wilkinson. New York: Academic Press. 
Rubery, ]. 1978. "Structured Labor Markets, Worker Organization and Low Pay." 
Cambridge Journal of Economics 2: 17-36. 
Shin, Kwang-Yeong. 1988. "Class, Politics of Production and Earning Inequality." 
Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, UniverSity of Wisconsin-Madison. 
Song, Ho-keun. 1989. "State and the Working-Class Labor Market in South Korea 
1961-1987." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University. 
Stark, D. 1986. "Rethinking Internal Labor Markets: New Insights from a 
Comparative Perspective." American Sociological Review 51: 492-504. 
Stone, K. 1975. "The Origins of Job Structures in the Steel Industry." Pp 27-84 in 
Labor Market Segmentation, edited by R. Edwards, G. Reich, and D.M. Gordon. 
Lexington, MA: D.C.Heath. 
Tsuda, M. 1973. "Personnel Administration at the Industrial Plant Level." Pp 399-
440 in Workers and Employers in Japan, edited by K. Okochi et al. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton Univ. Press. 
EE-HWAN JUNG received his Ph.D in sociology from Seoul National University and is 
a lecturer at Seoul National Polytechnic University. His resenrch interests are industrial 
relations and labor organization. 
